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Abstract When randomly assigning participants to experimental roles and
the according payment prospects, participants seem to receive ”manna from
heaven”. In our view, this seriously questions the validity of laboratory find-
ings. We depart from this by auctioning off player roles via the incentive com-
patible random price mechanism thus avoiding the selection effect of com-
petitive second price auctions. Our experiment employs the generosity game
where the proposer chooses the size of the pie, facing an exogenously given own
agreement payoff, and the responder is the residual claimant. We find that en-
titlement crowds out equality seeking and strengthens efficiency seeking. More
generally, we find that inducing entitlement for the roles in which participants
find themselves makes a difference. Interpreting participants’ willingness to
pay for their role as their aspiration level further allows to test satisficing and
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explore ’mutual satisficing’. We find that responder participants apparently
do not anticipate proposer generosity in aspiration formation.
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1 Introduction
So far experimental economics suffers from the ”manna from heaven” tradi-
tion questioning its internal and external validity. The few exceptions include
(i) experiments in which player roles are auctioned off (Gu¨th and Schwarze,
1983; Gu¨th and Tietz, 1986), (ii) advanced production experiments letting
participants first produce what they later distribute (e.g. Mikula, 1973; Hack-
ett, 1993; Ko¨nigstein, 2000; Gantner et al., 2001; Cappelen et al., 2007), (iii)
real effort experiments (e.g. Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Rutstro¨m and
Williams, 2000), and (iv) experiments assigning roles according to unrelated
quiz scores (e.g. Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985).
Here we follow the first way of inducing entitlement but employ the in-
centive compatible random price mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) in order to
avoid the selection effect of competitive second price auctions. Participants
first bid for buying the role in the game and then play the game only if they
have bought their respective role.
The specific game whose roles may be bought is the generosity game (Gu¨th
et al., 2012) offering two player roles: proposer and responder. The proposer
chooses the size of the pie which the responder and residual claimant can
accept or reject. In case of acceptance the payoff of the proposer is exogenously
given whereas the responder collects what is left from the pie after paying the
proposer.Unlike in the ultimatum or dictator game, there is thus no trade-off
between proposer and responder payoff in the generosity game: giving more to
the responder is no sacrifice for the proposer.
The generosity game has been used to study the trade-off between equity
(e.g. Homans, 1961) and efficiency seeking: Will proposers seek equality by
selecting a pie size twice as large as their own agreement payoff or will they
choose the largest possible pie size to maximize the sum of payoffs? Gu¨th et
al. (2012) have shown for the two-person generosity game with random role
assignment that pie choices are either efficiency or, less frequently, equality
seeking.1
Will inducing entitlement via auctioning off roles with the help of the
random price mechanism for each individual participant change the observed
equality-efficiency focus? What we observe is that even when the right to play
the generosity game has to be bought, participants care more for efficiency
than for equality, but that inducing entitlement further strengthens efficiency
seeking.
1 For a theoretical and experimental study of three-person generosity games in which
either the responder or a third ”dummy” player is the residual claimant, see Gu¨th et al.
(2010).
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Interpreting, similar to Gu¨th and Schwarze (1983), participants’ willingness
to pay for their role as their aspiration level for what they want to earn in
the generosity game, we also test satisficing (Simon, 1955). Due to asking
participants for hypothetical bids for the other role, we further explore mutual
satisficing (see Friedlander and Pickle, 1968) in the sense that (i) proposers
choose pie sizes larger or equal to the sum of own actual and hypothetical
bid, and (ii) responders accept pie choices larger or equal to the sum of their
own actual and hypothetical bid. Measuring a priori-aspirations via bids for
playing the game suggests quite modest aspirations.
Our study propagates a convincing method to explore behavior based on
entitlement and questions far reaching conclusions from experiments in the
”manna from heaven” tradition.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
our design and experimental procedures. In section 3, we derive our behavioral
predictions. In section 4, we present and analyze the data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
In the two-person generosity game experiment, participants are either in role
X, the proposer, or in role Y , the responder. Proposer X first chooses the
pie size p ∈ [p, p] with p = 7 and p = 17 which then responder Y , being
informed about p, either accepts, δ (p) = 1, or rejects, δ (p) = 0. In case
of rejection both earn 0 whereas, in case of acceptance, proposer X gets an
exogenously given payoff x and responder Y collects the residual p − x. We
imposed 0 < x = 6 < p = 7 < 2x = 12 < p = 17. The payoffs for all
possible decisions (p, δ (p)) are δ (p)x for X and δ (p) (p− x) for Y . Due to
x = 6 < 7 = p, the residual p− x is positive for all p ∈ [p, p]. Thus, δ (p) ≡ 1,
i.e. universal acceptance by Y and any p in
[
p, p
]
define an equilibrium when
both players are known to be opportunistic.
Participants are randomly assigned to possibly buy role i = X or role
i = Y , i.e. an individual participant is either a potential X- or a potential
Y -participant. To possibly play the game as player i = X,Y , each participant
i submits a bid bi ∈ [0, B = 13] with B = 13 < p = 17 facing a random price
mechanism: a random variable ri ∈ [1, B − 1 = 12] is drawn according to the
uniform density function on this interval: A participant with bid bi acquires
the right to play in the role of player i = X,Y if ri ≤ bi. In this case, the
i-participant gets what he earns in the role of player i minus the accepted
random price ri. If, however, ri > bi, i.e. the random price ri is rejected, then
the i-participant does not acquire the right to play and neither earns from
acting in the role of player i nor has to pay anything.
Clearly, this incentive compatible mechanism should induce an i-participant
to bid his certainty equivalent. for the prospect of playing the generosity game
in the role of player i = X,Y . For X the only uncertainty is whether the choice
2 See for opposite results Cherry et al. (2005) who find no entitlement effect in public
good experiments and Ruﬄe (1998) whose experimental workhorse is the ultimatum game.
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of p will be accepted;3 for Y the certainty equivalent is (p− x) for a given p if
Y is only interested in own payoff.
We implemented the generosity game in its normal form to obtain more
informative strategy data for Y -players. After randomly assigning the roles
i = X and i = Y for which a participant could bid (half of the participants for
the X-role and half for the Y -role), i-participants were asked for their bids bi.
X-participants choose the pie size p ∈ [p, p], knowing their own bid but not
the realization of ri (i.e. X−participants did neither know whether their bid
had been successful (ri ≤ bi) or not (ri > bi) nor the price to be paid for their
role). Y -participants, also not knowing whether their bid had been successful
and, if so, the price of their role, decide for all possible pie choices p whether to
accept (δ (p) = 1) or not (δ (p) = 0). To render the strategy method applicable
for responder Y , only integer pie choices p ∈ [p, overlinep] are allowed.
The role of fairness in the experimental game with induced entitlement
is not at all obvious. To see this, assume that the choice and acceptance of
p = 2x = 12 (equal payoffs) would be commonly judged as fair so that bx =
x = by would be the optimal bids. In the same way one can argue for other
commonly expected and accepted pie choices p like, for example, p = p = 17,
suggesting the bids bx = x and by = p − x. Thus, gains would result only
from random prices smaller than bids. While the positive difference between
bid and random price may vary for the two roles, participants have no way to
”share” their potential, but unknown gains from lower random prices.
Participants played the generosity game with its preceding bidding phase
for altogether 12 rounds, of which two were randomly chosen for payment.
There was no feedback in between. Thus, how a participant behaves is role-
specific, but otherwise totally idiosyncratic. The reason for repeating the bid-
ding and playing-game is that participants may only learn to anticipate how
bidding against a random price and possibly playing the game affect their
earnings. Thus possible dynamics in the sense of changing behavior across
rounds reflect only more familiarity with a complex decision environment in
later rounds.
For each round, we determined for all i-participants whether they bought
their role i or not. Participants acquiring their role i = X,Y were randomly
matched with a j-participant (i, j = X,Y, j 6= i) having acquired the other
role.4 The payoffs in the game implied by the strategies of the respective i- and
j-participant, minus their individual costs for buying their role, determined
participants’ payoffs for the two chosen rounds.5 Individual bids bi remained
3 According to the findings by Gu¨th et al. (2012) from their ”manna from heaven” exper-
iment, this risk is negligible for pie sizes p ≥ 2x.
4 As there might not have been an equal number of X- and Y -participants acquiring the
X- and the Y -role in each session, we used the decision of some participants repeatedly but,
of course, paid them only once, according to a randomly selected partner. Since there is
no feedback information the fact that one participant affects the payoffs of several others
(without knowing this) is unproblematic.
5 The costs ri for acquiring role i = X,Y , may exceed what was subsequently earned in
the generosity game, e.g. due to δ (p) = 0. Possible losses were subtracted from the show-up
fee or could be paid out of pocket when exceeding the show-up fee. Otherwise, participants
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private information to provide a best-case scenario for equal payoffs (proposal
and acceptance of p = 2x). We graphically illustrate the experimental process
by the timeline diagrams (Figure A1 and Figure A2 in Appendix A).
The instructions (Appendix C) first explain the random price mechanism
eliciting the willingness to pay and then introduce the rules of the generosity
game. Subsequently, some control questions are asked to check whether the
rules of the generosity game and those for buying the player roles - including
the optimality (weak dominance) of truthful bidding - are understood. The
latter has been checked by a pre-phase with experimentally induced values
to see whether participants actually accept truthful bidding as optimal. The
share of participants not deviating by more than one experimental currency
unit (ECU) from the induced value is 62%, i.e. the majority of participants
opted for truth-telling.6
The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran
four sessions with 32 participants in three sessions and 31 participants in
one session. Participants were students of the University of Jena (Germany).
Average age was 24.6 years and 57 percent of participants were female. In each
session, participants played 12 rounds. Participants were told that they would
be matched randomly. The 12 rounds lasted on average 25 minutes. Earnings,
including a show-up fee of 2.50 euros and earnings from the experimental pre-
phase, ranged from 0.50 to 46.10 euros. On average, participants received 17.09
euros.
3 Behavioral predictions
3.1 Pie choices and acceptance
How could entitlement affect the outcome of the generosity game? Having
to pay for playing the game, proposers may want to make sure that their
offer is accepted and that they do not incur a loss. Further, being aware that
Y -participants also paid dearly for playing the game, suggests an additional
reason for proposer generosity:
Prediction 1 (Entitlement effects): Compared to the generosity game exper-
iment with randomly assigned roles with double-peaked pie choices (p = 2x
and p = p), pie choices by X-players in the generosity game with entitlement
will be single-peaked at p = p.
had to fulfill an additional task at the end of the experiment to cover their losses. This
occurred only twice, and as we had participants register for a long enough time interval to
cover potential losses, none of the participants left the experiment with negative earnings.
The instructions clearly stated that payoffs amount to the earnings from the generosity game
minus the role price. One of the provided examples in the instructions (see Appendix C,
example 2) showed that negative payoffs were possible.
6 Exogenously induced true values avoid the problem that the true value may depend on
the random price (see Horowitz, 2006).
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Concerning Y -players, the picture is less clear: On the one hand, responders
might reject p-choices below 2x less often than observed in a situation without
entitlement to avoid or reduce losses due to paying for their role. On the other
hand, Y -players might also perceive pie choices p < 2x as unacceptable.
In our view, not informing participants whether or not having bought their
role and also not of the role price is a worst case scenario for observing treat-
ment differences between with and without entitlement, i.e. entitlement effects.
Of course, when providing this information, the random price might matter
too. For example, entitlement might increase with the random price one has
to pay.
3.2 Bids
We interpret participants’ bids as a priori-aspirations7 for what one expects
or wants to earn in the role for which one is bidding (see Gu¨th and Schwarze,
1983). Bids should comply with bx ≤ x for X-players and with by ≤ (p̂y − x)
for Y -players where p̂y represents the pie choice that the responder expects,
e.g. p̂y = 2x. If Prediction 1 is confirmed, and if responders have rational
expectations this would imply p̂y = p and by = p− x.8
Prediction 2 (Satisficing): Participants in the role of player i = X,Y earn in
at least bi from playing the generosity game.
”Mutual satisficing” in bidding is understood as bx + by ≤ p. Since par-
ticipants did not know their counterparts’ bids, we elicited hypothetical bids
concerning the other role by asking: ”Which b̂y
(
b̂x
)
would you bid if you were
a Y (X)-participant?” If motivated by mutual satisficing and expecting others
to decide as oneself,9 proposers X should bid according to bx + b̂y ≤ p with
b̂y as their hypothetical bid for role Y and p as their actual choice. Similarly,
responders Y should comply with (̂bx + by) ≤ p̂y with b̂x as their hypothetical
bid for role X and p̂y as their expected X-choice.
10
7 We cannot use the a posteriori-aspirations because they might be biased when the actual
price is much lower than the bid.
8 To explore whether or not participants have rational expectations concerning the be-
havior of the other player in the subsequent generosity game, we asked participants what
they expect their counterparts to choose. Specifically, we asked proposers X which responder
choice δ̂ (p) for their chosen p-value they expect. Responders Y were asked: ”Which p-choice
by X do you expect (p̂y)?” Of course, also the bids bi are informing about such expectations.
9 Such reasoning may, of course, be a false consensus when behavior is heterogeneous.
10 These questions (including the ones on proposer and responder expectations, see foot-
note 9) were asked in each round. Although one might be concerned that participants would
not answer them carefully and although hedging confounds have been shown not to be a
major problem (see Blanco et al., 2009), we refrained from incentivizing these questions
to not cognitively overburden participants. Answering the questions regarding hypotheti-
cal behavior and expected behavior of one’s counterpart might be considered as a ”mental
preparation” for own decisions.
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Both, X- and Y -participants might bid less than their expected payoff due
to stochastic and strategic uncertainty aversion. Stochastic uncertainty results
from the random price since the actual price ri is unknown when playing the
generosity game.
Prediction 3 (mutual satisficing): The sum of the actual bid bx, resp. by, and
the hypothetical bid b̂y, resp. b̂x, for the other role will be substantially lower
than p and possibly even lower than 2x.
4 Experimental results
As in former experimental studies of the generosity game (Gu¨th et al., 2012 for
the two-person game and Gu¨th et al., 2010 for the three-person game), we want
to study the inclinations of inexperienced participants and not the learning or
evolutionary dynamics based on feedback information about previous plays.
Due to the more complex experimental protocol letting participants play just
once, seemed, however, inadequate. Participants may change their mind and
behavior after becoming more familiar with the experimental procedure. In
Figure B1 and B2 (see Appendix B), we graphically illustrate that there are
no striking familiarity effects when classifying bids by being smaller than, equal
to or larger than 6 what would be implied by proposing and accepting p = 12.
This is done repeatedly for X- and Y -participants. In our subsequent data
analysis we thus can rely on first or last round as well as on average choices
of individual participants.
4.1 Pie choices and acceptance
According to Prediction 1, the choice of the equality mode p = 2x by player X
should be negligible compared to the case of no entitlement. In fact, we find
evidence for an entitlement effect:
Result 1.1: In case of entitlement, p = 2x is chosen significantly less often than
in the experiment without entitlement: with entitlement, only 16% (13%) of
proposers choose p = 2x = 12 in the first (last) round (see Figure 1 for the
results of the first round) compared to 40% in the generosity game experi-
ment without entitlement (see Gu¨th et al. 2012). Applying a binomial test
for Prob{p = 2x}, crowding out of equality seeking by entitlement is highly
significant.
Further, we also find an entitlement effect on the part of responders: Y -
participants reject p-choices below 2x more often than in the experiment with-
out entitlement.
8 Ba¨ker et al.
 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
Pie Size
Fig. 1 Percentages of Chosen Pie Sizes (First Round), x = 6
Result 1.2: Compared to the generosity experiment without entitlement with
rejection rates varying between 47% (p = 7) and 12% (p = 11) for pie sizes
p < 2x = 12 (see Gu¨th et al. 2012), responders in the generosity game with
entitlement show substantially higher rejection rates for all pie sizes p < 2x =
12. More specifically, the rejection rate for p = 7 in the first (last) round is
70% (56%), i.e. 44 (35) of 63 participants rejected p = 7, and even for p = 11
it is 22% (27%), i.e. 14 (17) of 63 participants rejected p = 11 (see Figure 2
for the results of the first round).
4.2 Bids
Concerning bids, on average more than 67% of X-participants bid less than
x, 26% bid exactly x, and 7% bid more than x, thereby risking a loss when
ri is between x and their bid. Overbidding x, i.e. bx > x, is rare compared to
bx ≤ x. The average (median) bid by X-participants amounts to bx = 5.21
(bx = 5.5).
11 The corresponding data for Y -participants are: 59% bid less
than x, 18% bid exactly x (expecting equality seeking proposers choosing
p = 2x), and 23% bid more than x (hoping for efficiency minded proposers).
The average (median) bid by Y -participants is by = 5.22 (by = 5). On average,
Y -participants do not increase their bids in later rounds (see Figure B2 in
Appendix B). There are very few bids by (t) exceeding 6 even in later rounds,
i.e. responders Y do not anticipate proposer generosity.
11 For X-participants there are no monotonic aggregate dynamics (see Figure B1 in
Appendix B). The distribution of bids bx (t) does not differ significantly across rounds
t = 1, ...12 according to a Mann-Whitney U test comparing pairs of rounds (significance
levels > 0.1 for all t = 1, ..., 12).
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Table 1 Classification of Bids according to Expected Counterpart Strategy
Relation Frequency
X-Participant bx ≥ δ̂ (p)x 251
(for chosen p) bx < δ̂ (p)x 516
Y -Participant by ≥ p̂y − x ≥ 6 98
by ≥ p̂y − x < 6 65
by < p̂y − x ≥ 6 568
by < p̂y − x < 6 25
For X-participants, ambitious bids bx ≥ δ̂(p)x are observed in less than
one third of all cases (251 out of 767), i.e. most X-participants include a
risk premium in view of their own hypothetical responder choice (see Table
1). Similarly, Y -participants overwhelmingly also include a risk premium by
bidding less than their expected payoff (p̂y − x): 593 (=568+25) out of 753
bids by Y -participants were below the expected payoff.
Result 2: In most cases we observe satisficing behavior in the sense that par-
ticipants in the role of player i = X,Y bid less than what they expect to
earn.
In view of ”mutual satisficing” (bi + b̂j ≤ p; i, j = X,Y ; i 6= j), the average
actual bid bx, resp. by, and the average hypothetical bid b̂y, resp. b̂x, add up to
10.43. Hence, the sum of bids is much smaller than p = 17 and also significantly
smaller than 2x = 12 (significance level < 0.01). For Y -participants there
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seems to be a familiarity effect, i.e. bid sums decrease across rounds (see Figure
B3 in Appendix B). Comparing the evidence displayed in Figure B2 and Figure
B3, this familiarity effect seems to be driven by Y -Participants adapting their
hypothetical bids b̂x and not their own bids by.
Result 3.1: The average sum of own actual and hypothetical bids is smaller
than 2x = 12 confirming Prediction 3. Furthermore, the sum of the two bids
by Y -participants is significantly lower than the sum of the two bids by X-
participants (significance level < 0.06). Y -participants apparently do not fully
anticipate the strong efficiency seeking by X-participants, illustrated in Figure
1.
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Figure 3 visualizes the distribution of bid sums, separately for X- and Y -
participants: low sums are more often observed for Y - than for X-participants.
Apparently, Y -participants fear spiteful X-participants. Efficiency (sum of
bids equal to 17) is rarely observed for X-participants and not at all for Y -
participants. The massive concentration of the sum of bids for both types of
participants is close to 2x = 12. Assuming that bids represent the payoff aspi-
rations of participants and that hypothetical bids represent the expected payoff
aspirations of the other participants, the fact that the sum of own actual and
other hypothetical bid is about twice as large as the own bid, suggests that
mutually satisficing participants assign their respective counterparts about the
same payoff aspirations as themselves.
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Result 3.2: When bidding for their own and hypothetically for the other
role, both X- and Y -participants are mainly focusing on equality, with Y -
participants, however, being less confident.12
5 Conclusion
In experiments of the two-person generosity game without entitlement, pro-
poser participants either display generosity by choosing the maximal pie size
or are equality seeking by proposing equal agreement payoffs for both players.
Inducing entitlement via the incentive compatible random price mechanism
crowds out equality and strengthens efficiency seeking. Similarly, responders
paying for their role more often reject unfair pie choices p < 2x. Using the bid
data from the random price mechanism to test satisficing, we find average pay-
off aspirations to be rather modest and below average, actual and expected,
earnings.
The ”manna from heaven” tradition of experimental economics is obviously
problematic and biasing game playing behavior. Compared to earlier studies
inducing entitlement, we avoid the selection bias of strategic auctions which
let only the most ambitious participants play the game what often implies
losses of such participants.
Providing entitlement in laboratory studies induces participants to exploit
the advantages of their position what should improve the internal and external
validity of experimental findings (Gu¨th and Kliemt, forthcoming). We observe
clear entitlement effects. In our view, similar to ”equality seeking”, also other
experimental findings may be questioned when properly inducing entitlement.
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Appendix A: Timeline of the Experimental Procedure
 
Instructions 
Control 
Questions 
Pre-Phase 
• to check 
acceptance of 
truthful bidding 
12 Rounds 
• without feedback 
information 
between rounds 
Payment 
• show-up fee 
• reward for 
correctly 
answering 
control questions 
• payment from  
pre-phase 
• payment for two  
random rounds 
Figure A1: Overview of the Experimental Procedure
 
1. Bidding  
• Choice of bid bi 
(0≤bi≤13) for acting in 
role X, respectively Y 
Drawing of 
Random Price  + 
Matching 
• Random price is 
drawn for each 
participant about 
which participants are 
not informed  
• matching of X- and Y-
Participants who 
acquired their role 
2. Acting in the 
Role 
• X-Participants choose 
the pie size p with 
7≤p≤17 
• Y-Participants choose 
for every integer 
value of p (7≤p≤17) 
between accept or 
reject 
3. Expectations 
Regarding 
Behaviors of 
Others 
• Elicitation of 
expectations about 
bids and actions in 
the game 
Calculation of 
Payoffs 
• Participants are only 
informed about their 
earnings in the two 
randomly drawn 
rounds at the end of 
the experiment 
Figure A2: Steps of a Round
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Appendix B: Familiarity Dynamics of Bids
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Figure B1: Frequency of Bids by X-Participants over 12 Rounds
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Figure B2: Frequency of Bids by Y-Participants over 12 Rounds
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Appendix C: Instructions
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. You will receive 2.50
euros for having shown up on time. Please remain quiet and switch off your
mobile phone. Please read the instructions — which are the same for everyone
— carefully. You are not allowed to talk to other participants during the ex-
periment. If you do not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from the
experiment and therefore from any payment. To make sure you have under-
stood the instructions, you have to answer several control questions before you
can begin with the experiment. You will receive 3 euros for correctly answering
the control questions. If you answer a control question three times incorrectly,
you will be excluded from the experiment. If you have a question, please raise
your hand. An experimenter will then come to you and answer your question
in private. The show-up fee of 2.50 euros, the 3 euros for answering the control
questions, as well as any additional amount of money that you may earn during
the experiment, will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The payments are made in private so that no other participant will know the
amount of your payment. In the experiment, all amounts are denoted in ECU
(experimental currency units). At the end of the experiment, the ECU earned
will be converted into euros according to the following exchange rate:
1 ECU = 2 euros
Please note that it is also possible to incur losses in this experiment. In
this case, you can choose whether you pay for the incurred losses out of your
own pocket or compensate for them by fulfilling an additional task at the end
of the experiment. In this task, you will be asked to search for certain letters
in a text and to count them. By doing so, you can compensate a 1 euro loss
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per extra task. Please note that these additional tasks can only be used to
counterbalance possible losses but not to increase your earnings.
Proceedings of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a pre-phase, followed by twelve rounds with the
identical course of action in every round. You will be paid for the pre-phase
and two of the following twelve rounds. One of these two payoff relevant rounds
is randomly drawn from the first six rounds, and the other from the second
six rounds. In every round, two participants will interact with each other just
once; afterwards, new pairs will be formed. Hence, it is very unlikely that you
will encounter the same participant twice in the course of the experiment. Your
identity will not be revealed to any other participant.
At the outset of the experiment, you will be assigned one of two possible
roles: X or Y. You will be informed of your role following the pre-phase, i.e.,
at the beginning of the first round. You will keep your role through all twelve
rounds of the experiment. However, whether you will be able to act in your
role depends on luck as well as on how much you are willing to pay for the
opportunity to act in your role.
1. Part: Instructions for acquiring the role
Following the pre-phase, i.e., at the beginning of the first round, half of the
participants are randomly selected as candidates for role X and the other half
as candidates for role Y. Thus, an X-candidate cannot acquire the role of Y,
and vice versa.
At the outset of the first round, you will be told whether you are an X- or
an Y-participant, and thus, which role you can acquire. You are then asked to
name the maximal price b you are willing to pay to act in your designated role
in this round. As your willingness to pay b, you can choose a number between
0 and 13 ECU (at most two decimal places): 0 ≤ b ≤ 13.
Subsequently, we randomly draw the actual price r that you would have to
pay to acquire the right to act in your designated role in the given round. The
actual price r is a number between 1 and 12 ECU (at most two decimal places):
1 ≤ r ≤ 12. If the actual price r is higher than your maximal willingness to
pay b(r > b), you do not acquire the right to act in your role. Consequently,
your payoff for this round is zero. If the actual price r does not exceed the
price you named, b, (r ≤ b), then you acquire the right to act in your role in
that round and pay the amount r for it.
If you acquire the right to act in your designated role in a given round, you
can earn a payoff (see part 2). The price r, which you paid for the acquirement
of your role, will be subtracted from this payoff. However, if you do not acquire
your role, you will receive no payoff and do not have to pay for acting in your
role.
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We recommend13 that you choose b so that you are indifferent between
“paying b and acting in the role with the prospect of receiving a payoff”and
“not paying b (if the randomly drawn actual price r equals your bid b) and
receiving a zero payoff”. If you choose a price b that lies below your true
maximal willingness to pay, you may not acquire the right to act in your
designated role even though you would have been willing to pay for it. If you
choose a price b that lies above your true maximal willingness to pay, you
might be required to pay more for acting in your role than you are willing to
pay.
Irrespective of whether or not you acquired your role in a given round of
the experiment, you will be asked in each round to make the decisions in your
role according to the following instructions:
2. Part: Instructions for acting in the role
In each round, each pair of X- and Y-participants can share a certain
amount of ECU. In the following, we will abbreviate this amount of money by
p.
• If you are the X-participant in your pair, it is your task to propose
the amount of money p to be shared. More specifically, you can propose the
amounts p, i.e., 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, or 17 ECU. Independently
of the amount of money p you propose, you will always receive 6 ECU for
yourself, and the remaining (p − 6) ECU of the amount will be offered to Y.
For example, if you propose p = 7, you may claim 6 ECU for yourself, and
1 ECU will be offered to Y; if you propose p = 8, you may claim 6 ECU for
yourself, and 2 ECU will be offered to Y, and so on.
• If you are the Y-participant in your pair, it is your task to decide
for each possible amount of money p that X may propose, if you ”accept” or
”reject” it. You will face the following table on your computer screen:
Amount of money p
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Accept o o o o o o o o o o o
Reject o o o o o o o o o o o
For every amount of money p, you have to specify in advance whether you
accept or reject it by clicking the corresponding button (i.e., you are required
to take 11 decisions per round).
After all participants have made their choices, your earnings and the earn-
ings of the other participant in your pair will be determined as follows: for the
amount of money p actually proposed by the X-participant, the computer will
13 We have decided for such a ”recommendation” rather than proving why this is the only
dominant strategy and then testing the acceptance of this proof by a pretest (see Gu¨th and
Tietz 1986).
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check whether the respective Y-participant in the pair accepted this amount.
If so, X will earn 6 ECU and Y will earn (p – 6) ECU. If Y rejected the amount
of money chosen by X, then both X and Y will earn nothing.
The possible earnings that the two participants in the pair will receive are
summarized in the table below:
X earns in euro Y earns in euro
X chooses p = 7
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
1
0
X chooses p = 8
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
2
0
X chooses p = 9
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
3
0
X chooses p = 10
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
4
0
X chooses p = 11
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
5
0
X chooses p = 12
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
6
0
X chooses p = 13
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
7
0
X chooses p = 14
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
8
0
X chooses p = 15
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
9
0
X chooses p = 16
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
10
0
X chooses p = 17
Y accepts
Y rejects
6
0
11
0
Two examples for the course of a round
Example 1: As a willingness to pay b, the X-participant in a pair names
the amount of 4.91 ECU. The willingness to pay b of the Y-participant is 7.62
ECU. The randomly generated actual price r is 3.20 ECU for X and 4.33 ECU
for Y. Since both participants offered more than the actual price, they acquire
the right to act in their respective roles. In his role, X chooses the amount of
money p = 15 ECU. Y accepts this amount. Accordingly, both participants
receive a payoff from this interaction.
• X receives 6 ECU, from which the price r = 3.20 ECU for the ac-
quirement of his role is subtracted. Thus, X’s payoff in this round amounts to
2.80 ECU.
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• Y receives 15 – 6 = 9 ECU, from which the price r = 4.33 ECU for
the acquirement of the role is subtracted. Accordingly, Y ’s payoff amounts to
4.67 ECU.
Example 2: As a willingness to pay b, the X-participant in a pair names
the amount of 7.80 ECU. The Y-participant’s willingness to pay b is 5.01 ECU.
The randomly generated actual price r is 6.20 ECU for X and 8.03 ECU for
Y. In this case, X acquires the right to act in his role, but Y does not. For the
following decisions, X is therefore matched with another Y-participant, who
acquired his role at a price of 6 ECU. In his role, X chooses an amount of p =
13 ECU. Y refuses this amount. Accordingly, both participants do not receive
a payoff but need to pay the price for the acquirement of their role.
• X receives 0 – 6.20 = - 6.20 ECU
• Y receives 0 – 6 = - 6 ECU
Your payoff
Your final payoff consists of:
An amount of money for showing-up on time (2.50 EUR)
+ an amount of money for answering the control questions correctly (3 EUR)
+ earnings from the pre-phase
+ earnings from a round randomly drawn from rounds 1-6
+ earnings from a round randomly drawn round from rounds 7-12
Please remain quiet. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
